As
declared by the Supreme Court, the residual power it is the power borne by the President’s duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It may also be viewed as a power implicit in
the President’s duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. (Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668)
Suarez
(2015) cited Hyman where the latter advanced the view that an allowance of
discretionary power is unavoidable and is best lodged in the President.
This power has been further enunciated by the
Supreme Court where it stated that “The Presidents power to conduct investigations to aid him in
ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case, fundamental laws on
public accountability and transparency is inherent in the President’s powers as
the Chief Executive.”
Thus, the
Executive Department is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully
executed. (Biraogo et al. vs. The
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. Nos. 192935 and 193036, December 7, 2010).
As
Nolledo (1993) explains: “The President
is enjoined to do justice to every man.
The President must consecrate himself to the service of the Nation. He holds the highest position within the gift
of his people, the latter trusting that he is offering himself to the service
of the whole nation, not to the service of himself or those close to him. In no case must the President violate the
sacred duties of being the Head of State and Government. His service belongs to the people. He holds the highest and exalted position of
the land as a trust. If he becomes
unworthy of that trust, he must resign because he becomes a disgrace to the
presidency.”
In
the exercise of the power to enforce and administer laws, the President of the
Philippines assumes a plenitude of authority.
This corresponding awesome responsibility makes him the most influential
person in the land. In the hands of a
Magsaysay or Quezon, it can be an instrument to uplift a common man; in the
hands of a Marcos, it can deprave and pervert it into a bludgeon of
oppression. Indeed, the impact of the
Presidency upon the nation is tremendous.
(Cruz, 1991).
Can the residual powers
of the President of the Republic of the Philippines be the subject of
abuse?
A study was conducted on how the President’s "implied"
and "residual" powers
can be constitutionally questioned. First, the President can issue executive
orders without prior legislative sanction; Second, the President can unilaterally reorganize
government agencies without regard for the functional
objectives and constitutional independence of other institutions; Third, the President can control
appointments to key public offices originally intended to counterbalance executive authority;
Fourth, the President can largely sought to insulate himself/herself from accountability for impasses
that resulted from institutional deadlocks which himself/herself has created; Fifth, the President can withhold funds
already appropriated when “revenues are scarce”; Sixth, the President can control the national
budget and delay the release of the local government units’ just share in the
national taxes (Internal Revenue Allotment or IRA) to use the same as a
political leverage to attract potential allies and pressure local opponents.
The
residual power of the President of the Philippines can result to a strong
President but a weaker legislature and judiciary. The system may suffer from
limited or ineffective constitutional checks on the Executive branch. The President may often aggrandize his/her
power by referring to the separation of powers to justify assertions of
authority and to avoid oversight from other branches or governmental
bodies.
In
the case of Romulo L. Neri vs. Senate
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations et al. (En
Banc), G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008, Romulo Neri, the Secretary of
the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), testified before the Senate
that he was offered a bribe to endorse a particular procurement contract. When
Senators asked about the President's involvement in approving the contract, Neri
invoked the executive privilege afforded to him by E.O. No. 464. After the Senate ordered his arrest for
refusing to answer its questions, Neri filed a petition with the Supreme Court.
The Court upheld the claim of executive privilege.
In this case, the Supreme Court relied on a
conception of broad residual executive power to justify the expansion of the
privilege, even against constitutional rights to public information.
Rose-Acherman S., Desierto D.
& Volosin N. (2010), “Hyper-Presidentialism: Separation of Powers without Checks and
Balances in Argentina and the Philippines”
Berkeley Journal of International Law, Vol. 29 Issue 1, University
of California School of Law.
Cruz, I. (1991). Philippine Political Law. Central Law Book Publishing, Inc.
Nolledo, J. (1993). The 1987 Constitution with Explanations. 1993 Revised Edition. National Bookstore, Inc.
Suarez, R. (2015). Statutory Construction. Rex
Bookstore, Rex Printing and Publishing Inc.
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